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Abstract
Existing research on the evolution of European integration has pitted economic against identity issues. In the economic
sphere, governments are arguably able to pursue their preferences more independently. If, however, identity issues be-
come politicized this is supposed to suggest that governments lose their dominant position in integration and gradually
become agents of Eurosceptic parties and/or electorates. This article looks at a phenomenon neither the intergovernmen-
talist nor the postfunctionalist perspective can fully explain: the emergence of the Visegrád Group (V4) as a collective actor
in European politics in early 2016. This emergence occurred in the wake of the refugee crisis during which the identity is-
sue of migration was politicized. However, there was no coherent partisan composition uniting V4 governments. Based
on a sequence elaboration of all press statements of meetings of the V4 Prime Ministers since their EU-accession in 2004,
we show that what at first sight appears to be informed by anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic sentiments may in fact dis-
play a more ambivalent position towards regional integration. The post-refugee crisis V4 appears as a case of politicized
transnationalism—that is, cooperation to achieve transnational interests under the condition of politicization. This transna-
tional interest not only comprised opposition to a relocation of migrants, but also the maintenance of a core transnational
freedom within the EU, namely free movement under the Schengen acquis. We conclude that, under the condition of in-
creasing politicization, identity issues help to forge government alliances of governments pursuing economic preferences.
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1. Introduction
Migration in general and the so-called refugee crisis in
particular can be regarded as the most important inci-
dent of the politicization of Europe. In combination with
traditional Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008),
opposition to immigration allowed right-wing populist
parties to poll new record shares of the vote through-
out Europe (e.g., Börzel & Risse, 2018). At the same time,
analyses of post-2015 European politics hint at new re-
gional alliances emerging in the EU, largely pitting coun-
tries affected and unaffected by immigration from out-
side Europe against each other (e.g., Biermann, Guérin,
Jagdhuber, Rittberger, & Weiß, 2019; Zaun, 2018).
The perhaps best-known of these alliances is the
Visegrád Group (V4), consisting of Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Existing since 1991 as a fo-
rum aiming to collectively achieve EU membership, co-
operation among V4 states hit rock bottom at the mo-
ment this goal was reached in 2014 (Nič, 2016, p. 283).
However, in the wake of the refugee crisis, the V4 began
to formulate common positions and in February 2016,
they successfully vetoed the implementation of a reloca-
tion scheme for migrants within the EU. All of a sudden,
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 95–106 95
the V4 appeared as the “castle where a central European
bloc was born” (Thorpe, 2016). This is even more re-
markable since the newly revived cooperation outlived
all changes to the partisan composition of V4 govern-
ments since then. The success of radical right-wing par-
ties in East Central East European countries varies widely
(Bustikova & Guasti, 2018). Both Poland and Hungary are
currently governed by Eurosceptic nationalist and pop-
ulist parties. In contrast, similar parties are in opposition
in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia. Irrespective of the
partisan composition of their governments, the V4 con-
tinue to refuse any compulsive relocation of migrants
within the EU and, inMarch 2019, succeeded to take this
topic effectively off the agenda of the EU Council meet-
ing (see Beisel, 2019).
The question we ask in this article is whether the
politicization of migration politics stemming from the
refugee crisis has led to closer cooperation among V4 al-
liance. The puzzle underlying our case study of one of
the allegedly most virulent transnational challengers of
supranational integration is that neither integration the-
ory occupiedwith incidents of deadlock is able to explain
why the V4 were successful. At first sight, and in line
with postfunctionalist assumptions (Hooghe & Marks,
2009, 2018), the newly revived V4 cooperation seems
to be a typical consequence of the politicization of iden-
tity issues such as migration in the wake of the refugee
crisis. But why then did it continue irrespective of the
partisan composition of V4 governments, thus defying
the electoral connection between government action
and voter preferences postfunctionalism emphasizes? If
V4 cooperation was less attached to electoral consider-
ations and confined to the governmental arena, what
was the economic interest liberal intergovernmentalism
could base on this position-taking towards European in-
tegration (see Moravcsik, 1998)?
In order to explain why the V4 could become the ‘cas-
tle’ of the Central European bloc, we aim to elaborate
the frequency, length, thematic focus on topics (espe-
cially those related of either identity or economics), and
sequence of self-commitments to collective action on
the top level of the V4 format, that is, the regular meet-
ings of the V4 Prime Ministers. The press statements fol-
lowing these meetings are agreed on by all V4 govern-
ments. Despite being non-binding, they can be regarded
as credible commitments on behalf of the V4. Our anal-
ysis suggests that the heads of the V4 governments did
indeed increasingly commit themselves to pursue com-
mon policy goals after 2015. These goals were ambiva-
lent towards regional integration. The V4 simultaneously
aimed to avoid a relocation of migrants, but also to pre-
serve one of the core transnational freedoms within the
EU, namely free movement under the Schengen acquis.
Our analysis proceeds as follows: In the following sec-
tion, we shed light on the peculiar relation between mi-
gration within and into the EU. Immigration from outside
the EU is understood as a danger to a core achievement
of European integration, the Schengen acquis that allows
for free movement (that is, migration) within the EU. In
the third section, we introduce the Visegrád format and
assess incentives and disincentives for the V4 to coop-
erate. The fourth section illustrates that both intergov-
ernmentalism and postfunctionalism have difficulties to
explain increased V4 cooperation. For intergovernmen-
talism, the public still plays a marginal role in European
politics. Its major actors are governments responding to
(organized) economic interests (liberal intergovernmen-
talism) or, in the absence of these, security concerns
(realist intergovernmentalism). From a postfunctionalist
perspective, united action of governments with differ-
ent partisan compositions is at odds with the existence
of a transnational cleavage (Hooghe & Marks, 2018).
The fifth section provides our empirical analysis of press
statements followingmeetings of the V4 PrimeMinisters
since the EU accession of Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, and Slovakia in 2004. From this analysis we
conclude that, under the condition of increasing politi-
cization, postfunctionalist identity issues can forge lib-
eral intergovernmentalist alliances of governments pur-
suing economic preferences. We term V4 cooperation
a case of politicized transnationalism—that is, cooper-
ation to achieve transnational aims such as the main-
tenance of freedom of movement under the condition
of politicization.
2. Migration within and into the EU
The need for a European regulation of an identity is-
sue such as migration originally arose from economic in-
tegration. The free movement of goods reached in the
Single European Act rendered it necessary to also regu-
late the movement of European citizens—that is, migra-
tion. Already the EU’s 1951 founding Paris Treaty that
established the European Coal and Steel Community in-
cluded freemovement provisions for workers in these in-
dustries. The right to freemovementwas initially granted
to workers only but has since been extended across cat-
egories to become a more general right. The Schengen
Agreement of 14 June 1985 brought France, Germany,
and the Benelux countries together in a far-reaching at-
tempt to abolish border controls. The Dublin Convention
of June 1990 provided that an asylum seeker would be
required to make an asylum claim in the EU state where
she or he arrived. Since the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam,
the Schengen Treaty is part of EU law. So is the Dublin
Convention since 2003. By 2014, 26 European countries
were Schengenmembers and all newmember states are
required to join as a condition of membership.
The result of the increased regulation of migration
at the EU level is the partial institutionalization of com-
mon migration and asylum policies. The Dublin system is
the main pillar of the Common European Asylum System
(CEAS). The CEAS encompasses several different regula-
tions that were adopted between 1999 and 2005. There
is still no general EU admission policy, but there are
EU laws covering asylum, the return and expulsion of
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third country nationals, family migration, the rights of
migrants who are long-term residents, highly qualified
migrant workers, seasonal migrant workers, and a sin-
gle permit directive linking work and residence (Geddes
& Scholten, 2016, p. 146). The 2009 Lisbon Treaty final-
ized the creation of a commonmigration and asylum pol-
icy with Qualified Majority Voting, co-decision on legisla-
tion between the Council and the European Parliament,
and full jurisdiction for the Court of Justice of the EU
(Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p. 152). In sum, the member
states remain central actors, but they now share power
with each other and with other actors, most notably
EU institutions.
The Schengen principle of open internal borders with
compensating security measures at EU borders can be
regarded as “one of the most prestigious EU projects”
(Biermann et al., 2019, p. 253). Once people are in the
Schengen area—and have cleared immigration control in
a Schengen country—they can essentially move freely in
all EU member states except Britain and Ireland, but in-
cluding the non-EU member states Norway and Iceland.
When people are asked what the EUmeans to them, it is
common for the first answer to be ‘free movement.’ This
is also reflected by the self-perception of EU actors (see
Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p. 151).
Rather than migration within the EU, immigration
into the EU has recently become the most pressing is-
sue warranting regulation in the wake of the so-called
refugee crisis. There were some 435,000 applicants for
asylum in the EU in 2013. This number rose to over
960,000 in 2015 (Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p. 156).
Increasing immigration led to a de facto suspension of
the Dublin system that was no longer enforced. In sum,
the Schengen acquis was effectively suspended. In the
summer of 2015, Hungary constructed a fence at its
borders with Serbia and Croatia to stop onward move-
ment of migrants who had entered the EU in Greece.
When Germany reintroduced temporary controls on its
border with Austria in September 2015, this caused
a domino effect unleashing a wave of unilateral bor-
der closings and caps for asylum seekers throughout
Europe. In November 2015 the Dutch, Austrian, and
German governments even launched the idea of narrow-
ing ‘Schengen land’ to only those countries really will-
ing and able to control their external border (Geddes &
Scholten, 2016, p. 154).
The European Commission proposed three policy
packages over the course of 2015 in order to maintain
the Dublin system and preserve the Schengen acquis. As
Biermann et al. (2019, p. 254) point out, all of these pack-
ages await decision-making or implementation or were
substantially watered down. By 30 March 2017, a mere
15,000 refugees were relocated under the proposed vol-
untary ad hoc relocation scheme for 160,000 refugees
(Börzel & Risse, 2018, p. 90). The suggested European
Border and Coast Guard has so far only established in-
crementally. The only successful measure to contain im-
migration was agreed with a non-EU member, Turkey.
According to this 6 billion Euro deal, for each ‘irregu-
lar’ migrant that Turkey takes back from Greece, the
EU would resettle one Syrian refugee from Turkey. In
the wake of this deal, the number of migrants dropped
sharply in 2016. What is more, due to resistance by the
V4 (and other reluctant member states), there is up to
now no prospect for a viable agreement on any perma-
nent relocation system for refugees.
3. Incentives and Disincentives to Cooperate within
the Visegrád Format
This section illustrates that the emergence of the V4 as
a transnational platform against further European inte-
gration was all but self-explanatory. Within the Visegrád
format, the governments of Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, and Slovakia cooperate with each other. The
Visegrád countries owe their name from a scenic town in
Hungarywhere the Presidents of Czechoslovakia, Poland,
and Hungary agreed to meet on a regular basis in
February 1991. Originally, the V4 had hardly any com-
mon interest but EU accession. In contrast to the Benelux
Group or Nordic Cooperation, there was no permanent
Visegrád organization apart from a modest International
Visegrád Fund (5 million Euros per year) devoted to
sponsoring projects in education, arts/culture, and sci-
ence and technology. Structural differences between the
V4 prevailed. Poland as the largest country always pos-
sessed a variety of alternative diplomatic options the
smaller Visegrád countries lacked. The Czech Republic al-
ways valued its relationship with neighboring Germany
as more important than that with any of its Visegrád
allies (Nič, 2016, p. 288). Additionally, the relation be-
tween the Czech Republic and Slovakia were initially
difficult once the latter broke away from the former
Czechoslovakia in 1992.
Given the lack of common interests among the V4,
the EU represented the most significant external power
to influence their polities after 1989. V4 was one of the
first sub-regional groupings to emerge in the post-cold
war environment. It was modelled along the lines of
the Benelux group and Nordic cooperation in the sense
that it basically consisted of elite governmental meet-
ings largely confined to the top-level political sphere.
Three distinct phases of V4 cooperation are identifiable:
1990–1992, 1993–1998, and 1998–2004 (Dangerfield,
2008). In the first phase, cooperation focused on two
key objectives: the dissolution of the Soviet-era security
and integration structures and accession to the EU and
NATO. For this reason, the V3 engaged in mutual trade
liberalization. The second phase was characterized by an
ice age due to split of Czechoslovakia into two countries
and the ensuing Slovak flirt with authoritarianism under
Vladimír Mečiar (1994–1998). Only in 1998, the V4 were
able to agree on a common strategy for EU-accession
again. At ameeting in Bratislava in 1999, the V4 countries
defined the Visegrád formatmore thoroughly. From then
on, therewere to be two regularmeetings per year of the
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V4 PrimeMinisters, two regular meetings per year of for-
eign ministers, meetings of other ministers as and when
needed, and meetings of presidents and parliamentary
representatives (Dangerfield, 2008, p. 645). Additionally,
the “V4 plus” formula provided the framework for the
V4 to cooperate, as a group, with third parties. In terms
of its content, the V4 agreed to cooperate in eight policy
areas (Strážay, 2014, p. 38).
However, relations between the V4 remained
conflict-ridden. In 2002, a dispute between the Czech
Republic and Hungary ensued about the question
whether the Beneš decrees of the 1940–1945 period
(during which Czechoslovakia was occupied by Nazi
Germany) were compatible with future EU membership
(Dangerfield, 2008, p. 647). In the same year, Poland de-
parted from the common V4 line at an EU summit and,
to the big disappointment of its partners, dropped its
demand to significantly increase agricultural compensa-
tion payments in return for one billion Euro lump sum
payment from EU. In return, the other Visegrád coun-
tries did not help the Polish government—that at the
time was eager to play an active part in shaping major
EU policies central to its own interest and ambitions—
defending the Nice Treaty in 2004. Against this back-
ground, Visegrád cooperation was in dire straits at the
moment of EU-accession (Nič, 2016, p. 283).
After EU-accession, there only remained two V4
goals: access to EU cohesion funds and Schengen mem-
bership (both of which the V4 achieved in December
2007). Freemovement within the EUwas particularly de-
sirable for the V4 since their populationsweremost inter-
ested in migrating to other EU countries such as Britain,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden in order
to work there. Indeed, internal migration within the EU
increased remarkably after 2007 (see Black, Engbersen,
Okólski, & Panţîru, 2010). Once Schengen accession was
completed in December 2007, new problems between
the V4 arose (Nič, 2016, pp. 284–285). There were diplo-
matic spats between Slovakia and Hungary over the for-
mer’s 2009 Language Law Amendment, followed by con-
troversies over the nationalist agenda in Budapest when
Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz came to power in 2010. Poland’s
strong anti-Russia stance clashed with Hungary’s privi-
leged partnership with Moscow over the Ukrainian crisis
in 2014.
The refugee crisis can be regarded as yet another
disruption in V4 relations because, albeit being of pri-
mordial importance in recent elections throughout all
Visegrád countries, it had different impacts on their re-
spective party systems. In Hungary and Poland, populist
far-right government parties benefitted from the crisis.
In Hungary, the already governing Fidesz could further
increase its vote share in 2018, not least by exploiting
anti-immigrant policy positions. The 2015 elections in
Poland demonstrated the potency of the refugee issue
as an electoral asset for mainstream parties. PiS (Law
and Justice Party) exploited public anger at the outgo-
ing Civic Platform government—that had voted in fa-
vor of the refugee quotas for fear of being isolated in
the EU—to increase its appeal to voters on the far-right
and also to center-right voters whose concerns were
rooted in fears about the consequences of immigration.
In contrast, campaigning against refugees backfired on
the establishment parties in both the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, that lost votes to right-wing contenders in line
with the logic outlined in the previous section (Bustikova
& Guasti, 2018, p. 172).
Despite the different partisan composition of V4 gov-
ernments, the recent elections did not necessarily pro-
duce an “illiberal axis” (Nič, 2016, p. 281) of Hungary
and Poland against the more liberal Czech Republic and
Slovakia. Public opinion in all V4 countries has been—and
still is—strongly opposed to immigration from outside
Europe. The background of this opposition is that the
V4 have virtually no experience with immigration. It was
only after 2004 that the new member states of the EU
for the first time in their history became destination for
migration. Therefore, non-native citizens still constitute a
very small share of the populations of the Czech Republic
(eight percent), Hungary, Slovenia, and Poland (less than
five percent each; Kobierecka & Riegl, 2016, p. 21).
Given the reservations against immigration from out-
side Europe among the V4 countries, there are signs
that their common rejection of relocation plans has
trumped all other divides. On the one hand, it is true
that only Poland and Hungary have so far refused to take
any asylum-seeker under the EU scheme while Slovakia
and the Czech Republic have taken in some refugees
(Bustikova & Guasti, 2018, p. 172). On the other hand,
the Slovak government joined its Hungarian counterpart
in an (unsuccessful) attempt to dispute the EU refugee
quotas at the European Court of Justice in May 2017. At
the same time, Poland became increasingly isolated in
Brussels (Nič, 2016, p. 287) and, accordingly, more than
ever likely to rely on its V4 partners.
To conclude, there are both hindrances and incen-
tives for theV4 to cooperate, that is to createmutual ben-
efits, rather than merely coordinate their actions with
the aim to render them more predictable (see Elster,
2007, p. 317). This raises the question: Which goal did
their apparent cooperation in thewake of the refugee cri-
sis aim to achieve? Aswewill see in the following section,
intergovernmentalism and postfunctionalism would an-
swer this question differently.
4. V4 Cooperation as a Case of Governmental or
Partisan Transnationalism?
While the intergovernmentalist perspective emphasizes
the governmental aspect of transnational cooperation,
the postfunctionalist perspective focuses on partisan as-
pects. From an intergovernmentalist perspective, their
common interest in free movement within the EU and
access to cohesion funds trumped the V4’s governments’
partisan differences and experiences and gave rise to in-
creasing levels of cooperation to fend off negative effects
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of the refugee crisis and maintain the status quo. In con-
trast, from a postfunctionalist perspective, the politiciza-
tion of migration in the wake of the refugee crisis has led
to closer cooperation among the V4.
Intergovernmentalism regards differences in integra-
tion preferences and bargaining dynamics as sufficient to
explain the variation in political reform outcomes. While
the realist variant regards member states’ security inter-
ests as primordial to explain the evolution of regional
integration (Hoffmann, 1966), liberal intergovernmen-
talism emphasizes the importance of economic prefer-
ences as expressed by interest organizations (Moravcsik,
1998). Both forms of intergovernmentalism are compat-
ible with each other if one assumes that whenever secu-
rity interests are diffuse, economic ones prevail (and vice
versa; see Schimmelfennig, 2018, p. 9).
Biermann et al. (2019) explain EU member states’ re-
sponses to the refugee crisis from a liberal intergovern-
mental perspective. According to these authors, the un-
even impact of the refugee crisis explained why some
states supported the relocation scheme and others did
not. Since the majority of member states were unaf-
fected by the crisis, they had a better bargaining posi-
tion and could maintain the status quo (of non-reform)
since 2015 (see also Zaun, 2018). But what about the
Hungarian position? Hungary clearly is an outlier to
the explanation presented above as it has the second-
highest number of asylum-seekers per 100,000 inhab-
itants after Sweden, so it can hardly be classified as
non-affected but nonetheless expressed a clear prefer-
ence for the maintenance of the regulatory status quo.
Biermann et al. (2019) argue that Hungary is de facto
unaffected because all asylum applications were turned
down. This, however, itself warrants an explanation. So
why did the V4 cooperate in the wake of the refugee cri-
sis despite the latter’s different impact and the variation
in bargaining power among V4 partners? From an inter-
governmental perspective, we would expect shared eco-
nomic (liberal intergovernmentalism) or security inter-
ests (realist intergovernmentalism) among V4 partners
to explain their cooperation.
Postfunctionalism provides an alternative approach
to explain V4 cooperation. Just like intergovernmental-
ism, postfunctionalism also starts from assumption that
member states are central actors in European integra-
tion. However, postfunctionalism puts more emphasis
to an identity approach. Given the increased salience
of a transnational cleavage, the conflict between
green-alternative-libertarian (GAL) and traditional-
authoritarian-nationalist (TAN) values arguably plays
an increasingly more important role that the utilitar-
ian conflict of economic preferences emphasized by
liberal intergovernmentalism (Hooghe & Marks, 2009,
2018). According to postfunctionalism, territorial iden-
tity serves as “perhaps themost powerful source ofmass
political mobilization” (Hooghe & Marks, 2018, p. 113).
There certainly is empirical evidence for an increas-
ing importance of the GAL vs. TAN conflict. Even prior
to the refugee crisis, Euroscepticism has always been
linked to exclusionist nationalism (de Vries & Edwards,
2009). After the refugee crisis, right-wing parties ar-
guably were the major beneficiaries of this politiciza-
tion (Börzel & Risse, 2018; Geddes & Scholten, 2016).
In general, support for right-wing Eurosceptic and pop-
ulist parties across Europe is driven by exclusive national-
ism and culturally based anti-immigrant attitudes (Werts,
Scheepers, & Lubbers, 2013). What is more, established
parties fail to respond adequately as they are, more of-
ten than not, deeply divided internally over European
integration. Against this background, the refugee crisis
could well be regarded as a critical juncture increasing
the politicization of migration within the EU.
Politicization is a core concept of postfunctional-
ism that explains the shift from a permissive consensus
(Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970, p. 41) to a constraining dis-
sensus on European integration (Hooghe &Marks, 2009,
p. 5). The result of this process is a newly dominant cleav-
age that Hooghe and Marks (2018, p. 110) term transna-
tional “because it has as its focal point the defense of na-
tional political, social and economic ways of life against
external actors who penetrate the state by migrating,
exchanging goods or exerting rule.” Politicization has
three dimensions: salience (visibility), mobilization (be-
yond the mere sphere of elites), and polarization (inten-
sity of conflict; Grande & Hutter, 2016, pp. 8–10). From
a postfunctionalist perspective, V4 cooperation could
be regarded as partisan in the sense that it serves as
a means to express anti-immigration sentiments. Given
the unanimous rejection of immigration from outside
Europe among the V4 populations, the migration crisis
as a critical juncture has arguably led to a “major shift
in the relationships between the four Central European
countries that make up the Visegrád Group” (Nič, 2016,
p. 281) and caused them to cooperate.
However, the postfunctionalist perspective also
leaves some questions open. Given the existence of a
transnational cleavage, why would governments of dif-
ferent partisan compositions cooperate to express com-
mon positions on a highly politicized issue such as migra-
tion? In order to answer this question, we need to assess
whether the V4 really claimed to respond to public con-
cerns about immigration or aim to mobilize political sup-
port against immigration—or whether they emphasized
shared economic or security interests (as intergovern-
mentalism posits). To do so, we engage in a sequence
elaboration (Mahoney, Kimball, & Koivu, 2009) of press
statements following the V4’s most important event, the
meetings of Prime Ministers after EU-accession in 2004.
The term ‘sequence’ refers to connected events that
unfold over time. Sequence elaboration can help to es-
tablish causal relations. From a temporal perspective,
the closer the necessary conditions are to the outcome
of interest in which they occur—here the establishment
of the V4 as a “cohesive bloc” (Nič, 2016, p. 281) in early
2016—the more important they will be (see Mahoney
et al., 2009, p. 132).
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Our focus is on V4 Prime Ministers’ press statements
because these display voluntary commitments. For all
these statements, we identified the topics V4 Prime
Ministers committed themselves to. It did not suffice for
a certain topic to be merely touched upon. Rather, the
V4 Prime Ministers needed at least to briefly elaborate a
common position on a particular topic such as a shared
demand for action. The V4 Prime Ministers’ press state-
ments are particularly well suited for a sequence elabora-
tion because they conventionally follow each of the half-
yearly meetings of V4 Prime Ministers (sometimes there
was evenmore than one statement related to ameeting).
These press statements are drafted consensually. From
this follows that if there is no willingness among V4 gov-
ernments to enter any commitment, a topic is left out of
our analysis.
We assert that several temporal aspects indicate that
the causal relevance of a topic referred to in V4 Prime
Ministers’ press statements increases as a reason under-
lying transnational cooperation: a) the higher the fre-
quency of press statements it is referred to in; b) the tem-
porally closer themeetings occurred to the refugee crisis
and especially V4 cohesion in early 2016; and c) themore
detailed—that is, longer—these statements are. Against
the background of the topics different theories of in-
tegration emphasize, the main question we ask in the
following content analysis of V4 Prime Ministers’ press
statements is whether economic (liberal intergovern-
mentalism), security (realist intergovernmentalism), or
identity issues (postfunctionalism) feature more promi-
nently with respect to their frequency, temporal location,
and elaboration. Our analysis is inductive which means
thatwe take all topicsmentioned in the press statements
into consideration.
5. An Analysis of Visegrád Prime Ministers’ Press
Statements
We examined a total of 50 press statements originat-
ing from 35 meetings of Prime Ministers in the 2004–
mid-2018 period. All these press statements are listed in
the supplementary file available online. Our analysis in
Table 1 starts with the frequency of meetings and topics
over the whole 2004–2018 period, but also in the pre-
and post-2015 periods in order to assess the impact of
the refugee crisis that enrolled in 2015. The frequency of
V4 PrimeMinisters’ meetings (see the last line in Table 1)
changed remarkably before and after 2015. There was
a total of 50 meetings equaling 3.4 meetings per year.
Before 2015, only 2.5 meetings took place annually. This
number rose to 6.6 after 2015. Put differently, the fre-
quency of V4 Prime Ministers’ meetings more than dou-
bled after 2015. This suggests that the refugee crisis
politicized the V4 and caused them to mobilize support.
Table 1. Frequency (per year) of topics mentioned in Prime Ministers’ meetings’ press statements (total numbers in
brackets).
2004–2018 2004–2014 2015–2018
Economic matters * 1.9 (28) 1.3 (14) 4 (14)
Of which on Schengen/freedom of labor market 0.9 (13) 0.5 (6) 2 (7)
cohesion funds/redistribution 0.6 (9) 0.5 (6) 0.9 (3)
financial/Eurozone crisis 0.1 (2) 0.2 (2) 0
other topics ** 0.7 (10) 0.4 (4) 1.7 (6)
Security matters * 1.5 (22) 1.3 (14) 2.3 (8)
Of which on international crises related to migration *** 0.3 (5) 0.2 (2) 0.9 (3)
international crises unrelated to migration **** 1 (14) 0.9 (10) 1.1 (4)
defense cooperation ***** 0.7 (10) 0.5 (6) 1.1 (4)
EU matters * 0.6 (9) 0.5 (6) 0.9 (3)
Of which on enlargement 0.4 (6) 0.4 (4) 0.6 (2)
integration/constitutional treaties 0.3 (5) 0.4 (4) 0.3 (1)
V4 specific matters * 0.7 (10) 0.5 (6) 1.1 (4)
Of which on presidency 0.6 (8) 0.5 (5) 0.9 (3)
Visegrád fund 0.6 (8) 0.5 (6) 0.6 (2)
Identity matters: Concern about immigration into EU 1.2 (17) 0.1 (1) 4.3 (16)
Total frequency of statements * 3.4 (50) 2.5 (27) 6.6 (23)
Notes: * Note that the references to the topicsmentioned here do not add to the total number of press statements (neither for particular
matters nor regarding all statements) since individual statements could include references to several topics; ** Food (2x), economic co-
operationwith third countries (Japan, Switzerland, France, South Korea, Egypt, Israel), transport cooperation, digitalization; ***Western
Balkan (3x), Arab spring, Paris terrorist attacks; **** Ukraine (11x), Georgia (2x), Belarus; ***** Either among V4 or with other coun-
tries such as Japan, Switzerland, France, South Korea, Israel. Topics in italics are further analyzed as potentially explaining if and why the
refugee crisis triggered a politicization of the V4.
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A closer look at the topics covered reveals that V4
Prime Ministers indeed communicated on meaningful
issues. Five broad categories played a substantial role
(in bold in Table 1): economic; security; EUmatters; iden-
tity matters; and those related to V4-specific matters.
The last category only came second to last in overall
frequency (before European matters that played a neg-
ligible role). This suggests that the V4 were not only
occupied with themselves. All more frequently men-
tioned matters are related to potential causal factors
mentioned in the previous section. The most important
category is economic matters that are overall almost
mentioned twice a year and four times a year after
2015. Security matters are clearly less often mentioned.
Remarkably, identity matters—that is, immigration—are
touched upon most often in the post-2015 period (4.3
times per year, more than any other topic). This further
suggests that the refugee crisis politicized the V4.
It needs to be pointed out that not all economic and
security matters referred to in the V4 statements could
be linked to the refugee crisis. For this reason, we fur-
ther subdivided these categories to separate those top-
ics possibly related to the refugee crisis from those un-
related. For economic matters, all references to the in-
tegrity of the Schengen area and the maintenance of re-
distribution within the EU could be related to migration.
As Table 1 illustrates, these issues were clearly more fre-
quently mentioned than the Eurozone crisis and other is-
sues. Similarly, their frequency rose after 2015. The same
is true for security matters, among which, however, in-
ternational crises related to migration were overall men-
tioned less frequently. Most security topics mentioned
in V4 press statements were not related to the refugee
crisis, notably the Ukraine crisis that enrolled in 2013.
We continue our analysis by further investigating the
sequence of press statements referring to topics that are
potentially related to the refugee crisis (displayed in ital-
ics in Table 1). As Figure 1 illustrates, these statements
clearly cluster in the post-2015 period. Throughout the
2004–2018 period, V4 Prime Ministers regularly com-
mitted themselves to action in international migration-
related crises and, in particular, to maintaining redis-
tribution within the EU and free movement within the
Schengen area. However, such commitments became
more frequent once the refugee crisis broke out. During
the July 2015 to June 2016 period, there was the (un-
til then) exceptional number of four Prime Ministers’
meetings that all aimed to develop a common posi-
tion on the refugee crisis in preparation of meetings at
the supranational level. As Figure 1 suggests, references
to migration initially also corresponded with references
to security concerns, but then became clearly associ-
ated with economic concerns since the second half of
2015 when the V4 became a brand. This suggests that,
while economic and security commitments were always
present, a politicization suggested by the post-2015 clus-
ter of statements only occurred once immigration be-
came a concern.
In line with our findings from Table 1 and Figure 1,
the evidence presented in Table 2 also suggests that
there were not only more statements after 2015, but
also longer ones. This was especially true for economic
commitments to Schengen and redistribution, on which
statements with an average of 832words were issued be-
fore 2015, a number that grew to 2,370 after the refugee
crisis broke out. The single most important topic was
immigration itself to which statements averaging 5,294
words per year were issued after 2015. The increasing
length of press statements further suggests that V4 coop-
eration grew after 2015. EU-related and V4-specific mat-
ters clearly played a less prominent role than migration-
related economic commitments. The only exceptionwith
respect to migration-unrelated issues is general secu-
rity matters, press statements on which had an aver-
age length of 2,353 words after 2015. We relate this to
the geographical proximity of the Ukraine crisis that al-
most paralleled the refugee crisis. However, the sharply
rising length of press statements on immigration and
immigration-related economic issues suggests that the
refugee crisis either induced governmental or partisan
transnational cooperation.
In order to further assess whether the apparent
politicization of the V4 went back to governmental eco-
nomic interests as posited by liberal intergovernmental-
ism or partisan motivations to mobilize against immi-
gration as suggested by postfunctionalism, we take a
One press statement referring to economic interests (above meline) or migraon (below meline)
One statement referring to security interests
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Figure 1. Timeline of V4 Prime Ministers’ meetings’ press statements, 2004–2018.
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Table 2. Annual number of words devoted to topics in Prime Ministers’ meetings’ press statements (annual number of
statements multiplied by average words in brackets).
2004–2018 2004–2014 2015–2018
Economic matters * 1,804 1,059 4,148
(1.9 *934) (1.3 *832) (4 *1037)
Of which related to migration 1,224 832 2,370
(1.3 *934) (1 *832) 2.3 *1037
on other topics 954 633 1,963
(0.8 *832) (0.5 *1160) (1.7 *1145)
Security matters * 1,520 976 3,365
(1.5 *1002) (1.3 *767) (2.3 *1472)
Of which related to migration 327 93 1,062
(0.3 *948) (0.2 *511) 0.9 * 1239)
on other topics 1,245 968 2,353
(1.2 *1003) (1.2 *805) (1.4 *1647)
EU matters 492 369 879
(0.6 *793) (0.5 *677) (0.9 *1025)
V4 specific matters 769 489 1,650
(0.7 *1115) (0.5 *896) (1.1 *1444)
Identity matters: Concern about immigration 1,376 94 5,294
(1.2 *1150) (0.1 *1029) (4.6 *1158)
All statements * 2,793 1,576 6,617
(3.4 *810) (2.5 *642) (6.6 *1007)
Notes: * Note that the page numbers for the topics mentioned here do not add to the total number of pages (neither for particular
matters nor regarding all statements) since individual statements could include references to several topics. Topics in italics are further
analyzed as potentially explaining if and why the refugee crisis triggered a politicization of the V4.
closer look at the arguments and commitments the V4
Prime Ministers presented after 2015. Immigration was
initially conceived of as a security problem: “In the South,
a belt of weak and destabilized states now stretches
from North Africa via the Horn of Africa to Iraq and
Yemen, creating an environment conducive to challenges
like unprecedentedmigration flows” (V4 PrimeMinisters,
2015b). Against this background, the V4 Prime Ministers
criticized that the European Council proposal “fails to ad-
dress and find adequate solutions to migration pressure
from and via the Western Balkan route as well as the
Eastern route” because any mandatory redistribution of
migrants would serve as a “pull factor” of further immi-
gration only to be countered by the “effective return” of
immigrants without a status as asylum-seekers (V4 Prime
Ministers, 2015b; see also V4 Prime Ministers, 2017e).
However, this conclusion already suggested an eco-
nomic perspective, because it waswork immigration that
the V4 were most critical of. In a simultaneous meet-
ing with France, the V4 Prime Ministers concluded that
“V4 and France consider the free movement of workers
and freedom to provide services as fundamental prin-
ciples of the internal market and important factors for
economic growth” (V4 Prime Ministers, 2015a). The V4
Prime Ministers did not further elaborate on these ar-
guments during the first of their chain of extraordinary
meetings beginning in the second half of 2015. Rather,
they expressed their full “solidarity” with Hungary (V4
Prime Ministers, 2015c) and developed ideas how to
fend off immigration: In September 2015, V4 Prime
Ministers began to refer to the need tomanage the “root
causes” of migration and to create hotspots to regis-
ter and, if possible, return irregular migrants. Together
with their emphasis on the “voluntary nature of EU
solidarity measures,” this created the impression that
the V4 Prime Ministers primarily aimed to mobilize sup-
port against immigration into the EU as such (V4 Prime
Ministers, 2015c).
However, before the V4 clearly emerged as a brand
in early 2016, this line of argumentation was augmented
economically. The V4 December 2015 Statement clari-
fied the common benefit of anti-immigration coopera-
tion beyond identity politics: Whilst acknowledging that
“allocating adequate financial resources in the European
Union budget” was necessary to deal with the refugee
crisis, the V4 Prime Ministers emphasized that “other
essential European policies, namely growth-oriented in-
struments such as cohesion policy, must not be affected”
(V4 PrimeMinisters, 2015d). In linewith this, they contin-
ued to emphasize that:
Schengen remains a key practical and symbolic
achievement of European integration. We reaffirm
our determination to preserve Schengen so that
European citizens and businesses continue to fully en-
joy its benefits. We underline the need for respecting
Schengen rules and declare our openness to discuss
how to best improve them. A proper functioning of
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Schengen and the preservation of free movement is
not a divisive issue but must remain the key objective
for all Member States and the European Union insti-
tutions. (V4 Prime Ministers, 2015d)
Remarkably, it was at this stage that the V4 Prime
Ministers apparently attempted to mobilize support for
the first time when they expressed their willingness to
extend their cooperation and organize like-mindedmem-
ber states in a group of “Friends of Schengen” (V4 Prime
Ministers, 2015d). This suggests that the V4 refusal of
irregular immigration in general and mandatory reloca-
tion of migrants in particular primarily aimed to main-
tain the principle of free movement within the EU. As
mentioned above, it was at this time that the Dutch,
Austrian, and German governments launched their pro-
posal to narrow the Schengen area since the free move-
ment principle had effectively been suspended by then.
Against this proposal, the V4 emphasized the need to
“preserve Schengen” including a “call on all true friends
of Schengen to join this effort towards a conclusive
debate on the key proposals tabled by the European
Commission in this respect” (V4 PrimeMinisters, 2015e).
Yet another appeal to the friends of Schengen and, re-
markably, only then the at that time usual suggestions
to deal with migration proper such as border controls
and the creation of hotspots with detention capacity (V4
Prime Ministers, 2015e). In a similar vein, the V4 in 2017
refused Commission plans to complicate the posting of
workers within the EU (V4 Prime Ministers, 2017a). This
suggests that in the immediate run-up to the emergence
of the V4 as a brand, their primary preferences were eco-
nomic ones—in line with liberal intergovernmentalist as-
sumptions. However, the V4 only politicized this prefer-
ence once they could simultaneously politicize an iden-
tity issue—as suggested by postfunctionalism.
After 2016, the pattern which had by then emerged
continued: V4 publicly denounced the Commission’s
plan to relocate migrants (V4 Prime Ministers, 2016,
2017d; 2018a; 2018c) and ultimately justified this with
economic reasons, primarily the need to maintain the
Schengen acquis. In meetings with or letters to other
heads of governments, be it from Egypt (V4 Prime
Ministers, 2017b), Israel (V4 Prime Ministers, 2017c), or
Italy (V4 PrimeMinisters, 2017d), the V4 emphasized the
need to address the “root causes” of migration which
for them apparently was economic despair. In line with
this, the V4 continued to call for returning all merely eco-
nomically motivated asylum seekers outside EU territory.
The nexus between identity and economic issues be-
came even more apparent when the V4 Prime Ministers
stressed that only well-protected external borders al-
lowed for internal freedom of (work) migration: “We
need to be able to fully protect the external borders
of the European Union. At the same time, we need to
remove internal border controls” (V4 Prime Ministers,
2017e). In 2018, they became even more explicit about
this nexus:
We must restore the proper functioning of Schengen,
as well as regaining full control over the external bor-
ders. Equally wemust protect and further develop the
Single Market based on four fundamental freedoms,
including the free movement of workers and services.
(V4 Prime Ministers, 2018a)
The economic reasons for the V4 Prime Ministers’ con-
tinuous rejection of immigration were not exclusive con-
fined to the maintenance of work migration and the
Schengen acquis. As the frequency, sequence, and elab-
oration of issues emphasized in their press statements
suggested, the V4 also emphasized the beneficial im-
pact of EU cohesion policy as “very efficient in reduc-
ing disparities among the regions” (V4 Prime Ministers,
2018c). With the exception of border controls, the V4
accordingly opposed any allocation of EU money to mi-
gration policies at the detriment of cohesion policy. In
contrast, direct links between security and migration is-
sues remained rare after 2016 (see for instance the joint
statement with the Austrian Prime Minister, V4 Prime
Ministers, 2018b).
6. Conclusion: Opposing Immigration to Maintain
Migration
The question underlying this article was whether politi-
cization in the EU has led to closer cooperation among
the V4 as a subgroup of EU member states against the
backdrop of the refugee crisis. We could indeed link
the emergence of the V4 as transnational challengers
of supranational integration to both the refugee crisis
and the process of politicization this triggered. However,
our findings partially contradict the doctrines of both
liberal intergovernmentalism and postfunctionalism. In
contrast to postfunctionalist assumptions, governments
appeared as themain actors of politicization irrespective
of their partisan composition and primarily focused on
economic rather than identity issues. As we have seen,
the emphasis on maintaining intra-EU migration under
the Schengen acquiswas temporallymost proximate to—
and, accordingly causally most relevant for—the emer-
gence of the V4 as a brand. However, the fact that V4 gov-
ernments did engage in politicization by means of pub-
licly calling on “Friends of Schengen” (V4 PrimeMinisters,
2015d, 2015e) and did only successfully do so when si-
multaneously politicizing identity issues contradicts the
assumptions of liberal intergovernmentalism.
From this we conclude that the “politics turn” (Braun,
Gross, & Rittberger, 2020, p. 1) in research on the EU is
indeed justified. We suggest that an emphasis on pol-
itics should aim to synthesize intergovernmental and
postfunctionalist explanations (see also Schimmelfennig,
2018): Under the condition of increasing politicization,
postfunctionalist identity issues help to forge classic
liberal intergovernmentalist alliances of governments.
This suggests that the recent politicization of the EU
is more ambivalent than often assumed: It gives rise
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not only to far-right parties benefitting from (and pro-
moting) Euroscepticism, but also to economic prefer-
ences to maintain core achievements of European in-
tegration such as free movement within the EU. Since
the pattern of transnational cooperation fitted neither
the governmental nor the partisan assumption, we re-
gard the post-2015 V4 cooperation as a case of politi-
cized transnationalism—that is, cooperation to achieve
transnational aims such as the maintenance of freedom
of movement under the condition of politicization.
It needs to be pointed out that our sequence elabo-
ration fell short of a fully-fledged process-tracing analy-
sis. For this reason, we could only tentatively con-
tribute towards a causal mechanism explaining V4 co-
operation that requires to be further fleshed out based
on a broader empirical basis. However, our sequence
could serve not only as the starting point for such
process-tracing analyses, but also for other analyses of
other member states’ responses to the refugee crisis.
Admittedly, a politicization of economic issues was eas-
ier to achieve in Central and Eastern Europe, where eco-
nomic and GAL vs. TAN conflicts are not cross-cutting,
but mutually reinforcing (Hooghe &Marks, 2012, p. 844).
However, it seems promising to expand our focus be-
yond Central and Eastern Europe and investigate how
other transnational forums such as the Nordic Council,
the six foundingmembers of the EU, the Franco–German
alliance, and the so-called Mediterranean club have re-
sponded to the critical juncture of the refugee crisis.
In the wake of the refugee crisis, we should expect
governments to increasingly respond to widely shared
sentiments of their electorates irrespective of parti-
san composition.
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